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THOU SHALT FUND MY RELIGIOUS
EXPRESSION: NEUTRALITY ALONE GORES
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN
ROSENBERGER V. RECTOR AND VISITORS
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Private religious expression is protected by the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment. Every person is free to practice the religion of his
or her choice, expressing devotion to his or her faith through prayer,
speech, or the written word. The Establishment Clause, however, limits the
government's ability to assist private religious expression. "[I]ndividual
religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was
stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all
religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or
group."t
This Note focuses on the tension between the Free Speech and
Establishment Clauses ("EC") when the government supports private
religious expression in a religion-neutral, government-created forum. This
tension was addressed in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia,2 in which the Supreme Court, in a five to four
decision, held that indirect state university funding of a private religious
student journal did not violate the EC if that funding was not purposeful.
Part II discusses the legal background of the roles of free speech and
private expression in the public forum. This section also examines the
relationships among private expression, government regulation, and the EC.
Part III focuses on Supreme Court decisions that consider whether certain
types of government restrictions on private religious expression are
consistent with the EC. In these decisions, the Court considered a variety
of tests when faced with potential EC violations. The Court's
1. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1947).
2. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
3. Id. at 2524.
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jurisprudence, however, is unclear as no single test has been held to be
dispositive. These cases set the foundation and tone for the Rosenberger
Court. Part IV examines the Rosenberger decision, criticizing the
majority's choice of neutrality to expand protection to private religious
expression while narrowing the scope and application of the EC. Finally,
after considering the differing tests and how the Rosenberger Court sought
to reconcile them, Part V argues for a stricter approach than that proposed
by the majority in Rosenberger.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Role of Free Speech and Private Religious Expression in
Government Sponsored Fora
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects private expression from
government regulation.4 Under the public forum doctrine, an analysis of
the forum determines the scope of the protection afforded to private
expression.' This doctrine supports the notion that government restrictions
on speech in areas traditionally vital to public communication are highly
scrutinized.6 In less vital areas, a lower level of scrutiny applies to
government imposed limitations.7 Therefore, the constitutionality of any
particular restriction on speech depends upon the area or forum involved.
1. Traditional Public Forum
Generally considered the equivalent of the public street comer,8 a
traditional public forum is an area of public land that by "long [standing]
tradition or by government fiat [has] been devoted to public assembly and
debate."9 Public parks, streets, sidewalks, and public squares are generally
categorized as traditional public fora."°
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (a designation
of fora in which varying degrees of government restrictions on speech are acceptable). For an
excellent discussion and critique of the forum doctrine, see Susan Ehrmann, Note, Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District: Creating Greater Protection for Religious Speech
Through the Illusion of Public Forum Analysis, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 965 (1994).
6. Ehrmann, supra note 5, at 966.
7. Id.
8. See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
9. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
10. Id.
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State regulation of private expression within the traditional public
forum receives strict scrutiny by the courts." A state may only regulate
the content of speech in a public forum if it shows that the regulation is:
(1) necessary to further a compelling state interest; and (2) narrowly
tailored to further that interest. 2 Similarly, a state may not discriminate
against any particular viewpoint expressed on an otherwise acceptable
subject. '"
2. Designated Public Forum
A designated public forum is created when the state deliberately opens
its property for limited public use as a place for expressive activity."
Although this type of forum may be accessible to only a limited segment
of the public for limited types of expressions, the state's action operates to
transform an otherwise nonpublic forum into a designated public forum."'
Once the forum is so designated, restrictions on private expression are
subject to the same strict scrutiny standard as applied in traditional public
fora. '
6
3. Nonpublic Forum
A nonpublic forum lacks a similar tradition of open, public expression
and has not been designated as a public forum by the state. ' The
Supreme Court recognized "that the First Amendment does not guarantee
access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the
government."'" In evaluating speech restrictions in a nonpublic forum, the
courts consider the state's need to preserve the forum for its intended, and
usually limited, use."' To preserve the forum for its intended use, the
state has leeway to draw distinctions based on the subject matter of the
11. Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (use of school facilities for community group meetings after school
hours); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (student center of state university designated as
a limited public forum).
15. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981).
19. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (citing United States Postal Serv., 453 U.S. at 129-30 (1981)).
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speech or the identity of the speaker."0 However, as with a traditional and
designated public forum, the government may not suppress a particular
point of view on an otherwise acceptable subject.2' Therefore, the
constraints placed upon speech in a nonpublic forum must be viewpoint
neutral and reasonable in light of the normal forum use.22
In traditional and designated public fora, the state can regulate speech
only when it can show a compelling interest and narrowly tailors the
regulation in furtherance of that interest.2 3 The Supreme Court considers
state compliance with the EC a compelling state interest when the state
seeks to regulate the content or viewpoint of the speech. 4
B. The Role of the Establishment Clause in Government Regulation of
Private Religious Expression
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protects private
religious speech.25 The EC, applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment, provides that the government "shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion., 26 Although the First Amendment
protects private religious expression, a state may not support or endorse
private religious expression if its action becomes an establishment of
religion. 7 One of the dangers of a perceived endorsement of religion is
that those who do not subscribe to the endorsed belief may feel that
disenfranchised from the political process2 Conversely, those who
subscribe to the endorsed belief may feel superior; they may feel they are
more important in the political process than those who do not share their
beliefs.29
20. Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (citations omitted).
21. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2147
(1993); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
22. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
23. Id.
24. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981). See
generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
25. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2141; Board of Ed. of Westside Community Sch. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263; Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The history of the First Amendment religion clauses is not
considered in this Note. For a thorough examination of the history of the First Amendment
religion clauses, see Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious
Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994).
27. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 623
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 627.
29. Id.
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The EC protects minority religious views from the domination of any
majority religious view by requiring government neutrality in endorsing or
stating a preference for any religious belief.30 This presents a problem in
that courts have difficulty deciding consistently what constitutes state
support or endorsement of religion.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that incidental state services
that indirectly benefit religious groups do not violate the EC.3 Fire
protection, police protection, and the use of state infrastructure are
examples of benefits available to the public at large. Although these
services have some ancillary benefit to religious organizations, they are not
construed as directly supporting religion.32
Similarly, the Court has disallowed state services that directly benefit
a specific religious concern.33 For example, insisting that the government
pay a student's tuition in a church-sponsored program would violate the
EC.34 Difficulty arises in using the EC to preclude state action where the
support or endorsement is not directly apparent.35
Under modem EC analysis, courts rely upon three tests to decide
whether state or private action violates the EC. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,36
the Supreme Court articulated the Lemon test to determine if an action
violated the EC.37 The test consists of three prongs that must be satisfied
to avoid an EC violation: (1) the government policy must have a secular
purpose; (2) the primary or principal effect of the policy must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the policy must not foster an
excessive entanglement between religion and the government.38
30. Id.
31. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398-99 (1983); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
32. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.
33. See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) ("Although
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely
prohibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a
particular religious faith.").
34. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 481.
35. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995);
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993); Witters v. Washington Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
36. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
37. Id. at 612-13.
38. Id.; see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271; Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
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Although some members of the Court criticized the Lemon test,39 it
has neither been overruled nor consistently applied. In County ofAllegheny
v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,0 Justice O'Connor, writing in
concurrence, articulated an alternative test to decide if an EC violation
occurred.41 Under what has become known as the Endorsement test,
"[e]very government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances
to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of
religion."42  This case by case analysis examines whether a reasonable
observer would conclude that a challenged government practice conveys a
message endorsing religion.43 Morever, the perception of the "reasonable
observer" in the Endorsement test goes beyond the perception of a
reasonable community member.' Justice O'Connor's reasonable person
is charged with the knowledge of the "history and ubiquity" of the
questioned practice.4"
Although commentators have expressed approval of Justice
O'Connor's wish to judge every government practice on its unique
circumstances," and of the Endorsement test itself,47 the Endorsement
test has never been followed by a majority of the Court.48 Criticism of,
and changes to, the Lemon and Endorsement tests leaves EC jurisprudence
with unclear standards.
Further complicating matters, a third test used by the Court focuses
not on the Lemon or Endorsement criteria of entanglement or endorsement,
39. For a ghoulish critique of the Lemon test, see Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
40. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
41. Id. at 623 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The
Allegheny Endorsement test has its roots in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
42. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch, 465
U.S. at 694).
43. Id. at 630-3 1.
44. Id. at 630.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses,
Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151, 174
(1987).
47. See, e.g., Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modifications
of the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 465; William P.
Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 495 (1986).
48. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995). Justice
Scalia attempts to limit the Endorsement test to government actions. Id. at 2447. In concurring
opinions, Justices O'Connor, Souter and Breyer support the Endorsement test as applicable to
private expression and use the test to reach the same result as Justice Scalia. Id. at 2451.
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but instead considers the neutrality of the program or regulation. Under the
Neutrality test, as long as the program is religion-neutral, indirectly
dispersing benefits to a religious institution does not violate the EC.49
The focus on program neutrality versus perceived endorsement represents
a serious divide in current EC jurisprudence.
When coupled with free speech concerns, the uncertainty of when an
EC violation occurs creates a tension between a wavering EC and the Free
Speech Clause. 50 The following cases illustrate how the Court treats this
tension.
III. THE SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Widmar v. Vincent
Widmar v. Vincent5' addressed whether the EC could be invoked to
justify a state university regulation that prohibited the use of university
facilities "for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."52 A
student religious group, Cornerstone, applied for and received status as a
registered student group.53 Cornerstone was one of 100 such registered
groups that utilized university facilities for religious meetings from 1973
to 1977.m In 1977, Cornerstone was informed by the university that it
could no longer hold meetings in school facilities due to a regulation
passed in 1972 that forbade use of the facilities for religious worship. 55
49. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Washington
Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
50. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981); Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2525 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
52. Id. at 265.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 265-66 n.3. The university regulation is as follows:
4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein
provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by
either student or nonstudent groups .... The general prohibition against use of
University buildings and grounds for religious worship or religious teaching is a
policy required, in the opinion of The Board of Curators, by the Constitution and
laws of the State and is not open to any other construction. No regulations shall be
interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of
religion at public functions held in University facilities ....
4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds may be used for
religious services but not for regular recurring services of any groups. Special rules
and procedures shall be established for each such chapel by the Chancellor. It is
specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to any religious group.
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Cornerstone brought suit alleging that the regulation violated its rights
to the free exercise of religion and freedom of speech under the First
Amendment. 6 The district court upheld the challenged regulation, finding
that the EC prohibited the state from providing facilities for religious use
because doing so could be viewed as supporting an institution of
religion." The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, viewing
the university regulation as a content-based discrimination against private
religious expression for which the university had no justification.58 That
court found that the EC does not bar a policy of equal access where
facilities are open to groups of all kinds.59 The appellate court reasoned
that the primary effect of the regulation would not be to advance religion,
but to further the neutral purpose of developing students' "social and
cultural awareness as well as intellectual curiosity. '
On review, the Supreme Court determined that the university "created
a forum generally open for use by student groups"'61 through its past
policy of accommodating student group meetings. Having created this
limited public forum, the university was then forbidden from enforcing
certain exclusions "even [though] it was not required to create the forum
in the first place. 62  In applying against state universities the First
Amendment freedoms of speech and association, the Court held that strict
scrutiny applied to any university exclusion of student groups based on
their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship
and discussion.63
Using a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court found that complying with
the EC was a compelling interest of the university.' The Court then
reasoned that an equal access policy satisfying the Lemon test will not
offend the EC. Finding no issues with the first and third prongs of the
Lemon test, the Court focused on whether permitting religious groups to
Id. at 265-66 n.3.
56. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th
Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
57. Id. at 915-16 (applying Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)).
58. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1316 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981).
59. Id. at 1317.
60. Id. at 1312 n. I (quoting from the University bulletin description of the student activities
program).
61. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267.
62. Id. at 268.
63. Id. at 267-68 n.5; see also supra part II.A.2.
64. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271.
65. Id.; see also supra part II.B.
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share the limited public forum satisfies the second prong, i.e., have the
"primary effect" of advancing religion.66
The Court observed that the forum is available to a broad class of
speakers.67 In the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups
dominate the forum, a religious organization's enjoyment of merely
incidental benefits does not violate the prohibition against the primary
advancement of religion.6' However, the Court limited its decision to a
limited public forum created by a state university.69 The Court did not
"question the right of the University to make academic judgments on how
to allocate its scarce resources. 70
B. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District
In Lamb s Chapel v. Center Moriches School District,71 Center
Moriches ("Center"), pursuant to section 414 of the New York Education
Law, issued "rules and regulations with respect to the use of school
property when not in use for school purposes. ' 72 The rules permitted only
two of the ten uses authorized under section 414: (1) social, civic, or
recreational uses; and (2) use by political organizations. 73 Lamb's Chapel
("Church"), under the social, civic, or recreational use, sought to use school
property to show a film on child rearing from a Christian perspective.74
The Church's application to show the film was turned down twice by the
Center."
The Church filed suit in district court claiming that the Center's
actions violated the Freedom of Speech and Assembly Clauses, the Free
Exercise Clause, and the EC. 76 Noting that the Center did not open its
facilities to any organizations for religious purposes, the district court held
that the denial was viewpoint neutral and did not violate the Freedom of
66. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-72.
67. Id. at 274.
68. Id. at 275.
69. Id. at 277.
70. Id. at 276. The Court also affirmed the validity of cases that recognized a state univer-
sity's right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or
that substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education. Id. at
276-77.
71. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
72. Id. at 2144.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2144-45.
76. 113 S. Ct. at 2145.
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Speech Clause." The district court also rejected the Church's assertion
that the Center's actions demonstrate hostility toward religion and
advancement of non-religion that is not justified under the EC.7"
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment "in all
respects."79 The appellate court held that school property, when not in use
for school purposes, was neither a traditional nor a designated public
forum. 0 The after-school use was classified as a limited public forum,
which allowed the school to remain nonpublic except as to specified uses
after school.81 The court stated that restrictions in a limited public forum
need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral, and that the Center did not
violate this standard.
8 2
The Supreme Court then considered whether denying the Church
access to school premises to exhibit a film, for public viewing and for
assertedly religious purposes, violated the Free Speech and the Establish-
ment Clauses. 3 The Court began its analysis by determining that the
Center, like a private owner of property, may legally preserve the property
under its control for its intended use." The Court said that the film dealt
with an otherwise permissible subject (child rearing) and was disallowed
only because it discussed child rearing from a religious viewpoint.85
"'[T]he First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in
ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others."'
8 6
Therefore, in discriminating against the film because of the film's
viewpoint, the Center could regulate its showing only if there were a
compelling state interest for which the regulation was narrowly tailored. 7
After recognizing that abiding by the EC was a compelling interest,
the Court found that, as in Widmar, there was no real danger that the
community would think the Center was endorsing religion or any particular
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 389 (2nd Cir.
1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
80. Id. at 386.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2144.
84. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at 2144.
85. Id. at 2147.
86. Id. at 2147-48 (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984)).
87. Id. at 2147.
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creed, since the use of the facility was merely incidental.88 Therefore,
showing the film on school premises did not violate the EC.
The Court in Lamb's Chapel has been criticized for sidestepping
forum analysis and jumping directly to viewpoint discrimination. 9 If the
Court found that the regulation prohibited the Church from showing
religious films in a nonpublic forum, then the Center may be justified in
denying the showing of the film if that denial was reasonable and
viewpoint neutral. As discussed above, this approach requires balancing
the importance of showing the film against the preservation of the
forum.90 However, because the Lamb's Chapel Court interpreted the
regulation as discriminating against a religious viewpoint, it did not
consider the appropriate forum or use any balancing test.91
In finding viewpoint-based discrimination, the Court applied strict
scrutiny analysis. If the Court had determined that the discrimination was
not viewpoint-based, and then followed the public forum analysis, the
Center's action would have been subject to a lower level of scrutiny,
resulting in a different outcome.
C. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette92 was decided
by the Supreme Court during the same session as Rosenberger.93 In
Capitol Square, the Court considered whether the placement of a cross by
the Ku Klux Klan ("Klan") in a public square violated the EC.'
After being refused a permit by the state to erect the cross, the Klan
filed suit in a district court seeking an injunction to require the Board to
issue the permit.9" The Board defended its decision on the ground that
granting the permit would violate the EC.96 The court determined that
Capitol Square was a traditional public forum, that the cross was an entirely
private expression entitled to First Amendment protection, and that the
88. Id. at 2148; see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274. Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, questioned
why the majority persisted in using the much criticized Lemon test to find government
endorsement. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at 2149 (Scalia, J., concurring).
89. See Ehrmann, supra note 5.
90. See supra part II.A.3.
91. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144-48.
92. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
93. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
94. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2444-45.
95. Pinette v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D. Ohio 1993),
aft'd, 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 1994), aft'd, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
96. Id. at 1184.
1996]
828 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 16
Board failed to show that the cross could reasonably be construed as an
endorsement of religion by the state.97 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.98
In affirming the decision of the appellate court, the Supreme Court
recognized that the display of the cross was private expression protected by
the First Amendment and then applied the public forum analysis." The
Court considered the location of the cross and how the property had been
traditionally used to determine the scope of the protection afforded the
private expression." Because the square was a traditional public forum,
the Board could regulate the content of private expression in the square
only if the regulation was necessary to serve a compelling state
interest.1'1
As in Widmar and Lamb 's Chapel, the Court found that the Board had
a compelling interest to abide by the Constitution and not violate the
EC.' °2 To determine if an EC violation had occurred, Justice Scalia
identified a significant difference between government actions interpreted
to support religion and private expressions that occur in a religion-neutral
environment provided by the government. °3 The Court determined that
the Endorsement test applied only when the government was speaking or
encouraging others to speak on its behalf.' 4 According to the Court,
where the religious expression is purely private, involving no state action,
and occurs in a traditional public forum, publicly announced and open to
all on equal terms, the religious expression does not violate the EC."°5
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Souter
and Breyer, applied the Endorsement test she previously outlined in
Allegheny'06 and reached the same conclusion as the majority.0 7 Al-
97. Id. at 1188.
98. Pinette v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 30 F.3d 675, 676 (6th Cir. 1994),
aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
99. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2446.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983)).
102. Id.; see Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2148-49 (1992); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981).
103. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2446-48. Compare County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) with Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263 (Allegheny
considers government expression as an endorsement of religion; Widmar considers whether
government support of private expression is an endorsement of religion.).
104. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2447-48.
105. Id. at 2450.
106. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. Justice O'Connor concluded that there was "no realistic danger that the community
would think that the [State] was endorsing religion or any particular creed [by allowing the cross
SCHOOL AND RELIGION
though the plurality did not wish to apply the Endorsement test to purely
private expressions and sought a categorical rule for such expressions,'
0 8
Justice O'Connor used the Endorsement test to determine if a "reasonable
person" would conclude that the state endorses the religious message of the
cross in the square."°9 Justice O'Connor stated that "[e]xperience proves
that the Establishment Clause ... cannot easily be reduced to a single
test"" and that the Endorsement test satisfies the "fundamental re-
quirement of the Establishment Clause when courts are called upon to
evaluate the constitutionality of religious symbols on public property.""'
Justice O'Connor's test differs from the bright line rule expressed by the
plurality because the facts are considered on a case by case basis to
determine if an endorsement of religion has occurred in a traditional public
forum. Therefore, under the Endorsement test, a purely private religious
expression in a traditional public forum might violate the EC.
D. The EC Versus Neutrality: Summation of the Supreme Court Cases
The above cases illustrate how the Court addressed the tension
between the interests of private religious expression and a government's
interest in complying with the EC. The Court applied differing public
forum doctrines and tests to determine if an EC violation occurred when
dealing with private religious expressions. In Widmar"2 and Lamb's
Chapel,"' the Court expanded protection of religious expression in
content-neutral forums to the incidental use of government property. The
plurality in Capitol Square extended the protection of private religious
expression to traditional public fora regardless of any perceived state
endorsement of the private message." '4 The common thread running
through these cases is the Court's reluctance to find an EC violation in
religion-neutral forums. In each case, groups sought to express themselves
on government property, and their use of the property was deemed
incidental and not dispositive of a state desire to endorse a religious view.
to be displayed]." Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2451 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2143 (1993)).
108. Id. at 2450 n.3.
109. Id. at 2451-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 2452 (quoting Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114
S. Ct. 2481, 2499 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
I 11. Id. at 2452 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
113. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
114. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2450.
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Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia' takes
this analysis a step further, considering whether indirect state financial
support of private religious expression violates the EC or is merely
incidental.
IV. THE NEXT STEP FOR NEUTRALITY: THE ROSENBERGER DECISION
A. Facts of the Case
At the University of Virginia ("University"), student organizations
("CIOs") are encouraged to publish student journals on various topics to
supplement the intellectual environment at the University.11 6 A standard
agreement between each CIO and the University provides that the benefits
and opportunities afforded the CIOs "should not be misinterpreted as
meaning that those organizations are part of or controlled by the University,
that the University is responsible for the organizations' contracts or other
acts or omissions, or that the University approves of the organizations'
goals or activities."" 7  Once the journals are published, the CIOs can
seek reimbursement of the printing fees from the Student Activity Fund
("SAF")." 8 Established and governed by University guidelines, the SAF
supports a broad range of extracurricular student activities that are "related
to the educational purpose of the University."" 9 The SAF is funded from
a mandatory fourteen dollar fee collected from each student attending the
University. 2' To obtain reimbursement from the SAF, the CIO must file
a request with the Student Council.' 2 ' The Council's actions are subject
to review by a faculty body chaired by a designee of the Vice-President for
Student Affairs.1 22  Excluded from SAF support, religious activity is
defined in the guidelines as any activity that primarily promotes or
manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality. 23
Wide Awake Productions ("WAP"), an approved CIO, published Wide
Awake, a magazine of "philosophical and religious expression ... [t]o
facilitate discussion which fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity and
115. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
116. Id. at 2514.
117. Id. (quoting the University agreement).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2515.
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tolerance of Christian viewpoints ... [and] [t]o provide a unifying focus
for Christians of multicultural backgrounds."' 2 4 After Wide Awake was
published, WAP sought reimbursement from the SAF."23 The Student
Council committee denied the request, determining that the SAF could not
fund a "religious activity" as defined by the University Guidelines.
26
WAP appealed the denial to the full Student Council, contending that WAP
had met all of the applicable guidelines and that denial of SAF funding on
the basis of the publication's religious perspective violated the
Constitution. 27  The full Student Council denied the request without
further comment. 21 WAP then appealed to the Student Activities
Committee, which sustained the denial of funding.
29
B. The Lower Courts' Decisions
Exhausting University appeals, WAP brought suit in the district court
alleging that the University's action violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983."3° WAP
argued that by not authorizing payment of the publication's printing costs,
the University violated WAP's rights to free speech, freedom of the press,
and free exercise of religion. '3' The district court held that the denial of
SAF support did not impermissibly discriminate on the basis of content or
viewpoint and that the University's EC compliance concern was a sufficient
justification for denying payment to a third party contractor.'32
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
University Guidelines discriminated against WAP on the basis of content
and that there was a presumptive violation of the Free Speech Clause when
a state actor discriminates on the basis of viewpoint by denying payment
otherwise available to other CIOs. 
33
Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed the district court decision,
concluding that the University policy was justified by the compelling
124. Id.
125. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 67).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 176-77 (W.D.
Va. 1992), aff'd, 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2515-16 (1995).
131. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516.
132. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 181-82.
133. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 279-81 (4th Cir.
1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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interest in avoiding an EC violation.'34 The appellate court found that the
direct monetary subsidization of the religious publication was "a beast of
an entirely different color."'' 3' The court held that the EC would not
permit the use of public funds to support a "specifically religious activity
in an otherwise secular setting."' 36  The provision of SAF funding for
WAP's publication would "send an unmistakably clear signal that the
University... supports Christian values and wishes to promote.., such
values."' 37
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Rosenberger was a
five to four reversal of the court of appeals.'38 The Court determined that
the University may indirectly fund private religious expression occurring
in a limited public forum, provided the funding is not done for the purpose
of advancing religion.'39
1. The University May Not Withhold Funding Solely
Because It Does Not Like the Message
Although the plurality's decision that the University unconstitutionally
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint is the correct result, the plurality
takes an interesting route to reach this conclusion. The plurality opinion
begins with a discussion of previous cases and concludes that the
government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in a limited
public forum of its own creation. 4 ° "The government must abstain from
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction."'' The
plurality then uses the public forum doctrine to draw a distinction between
content and viewpoint discrimination:
134. Id. at 286.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 285 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
137. Id. at 286.
138. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). The
decision is divided into the plurality opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justices Scalia and Thomas; the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor; and the
dissenting opinion of Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id.
139. Id. at 2524-25.
140. Id. at 2517.
141. Id. at 2516; see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983).
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[I]n determining whether the State is acting to preserve the
limits of the forum it has created so that the exclusion of a class
of speech is legitimate, we have observed a distinction between,
on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be permis-
sible if it preserves the purpose of that limited forum, and, on
the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed
impernissible when directed against speech otherwise within the
forum's limitations.1
42
By classifying the SAF as a "limited public forum," the plurality uses a
hybrid of the analysis traditionally used for the designated public and
nonpublic forums. 43  Under a traditional forum analysis, if the SAF is
a "metaphysical" forum designated by the University, then the University
has created a designated public forum.'" Restrictions on the content of
the forum or viewpoint of the speakers are subject to strict scrutiny.'
4
However, the plurality opinion states that the University can restrict
content if the restriction would "further the purpose" of the forum, a much
lower standard than is usually associated with the nonpublic forum.'
46
The plurality may be using this hybrid analysis to echo the strong feelings
the Widmar court had regarding the University's right to make curriculum
choices. '4 ' The forum constructed by the University here, however, is not
a forum to teach or conduct regular University business but is designed to
encourage speech apart from the educational curriculum offered by the
University. 4  There is no need to differentiate this forum from a
designated public forum in order to uphold the autonomy of the University,
relative to its curriculum.
The plurality held that in attempting to restrict the speech in the
designated public forum, the University was not seeking to control content
but to control the viewpoint of WAP.' 49 Acknowledging that the lines
between content and viewpoint discrimination are sometimes difficult to
discern, the plurality determined that the SAF prohibition did not exclude
142. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
143. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
144. The plurality defines the forum constructed by the University as "metaphysical," but
the same principles of forum analysis apply. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
145. See supra part II.A.2.
146. See supra part II.A.3.
147. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981).
148. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-17.
149. Id. at 2520.
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religion as a subject matter.150  Rather, the SAF prohibition disfavored
those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.''
Perhaps a shorter, more results-oriented route could have been taken
by the plurality, had they specifically addressed the University's deter-
mination that Muslim and Jewish journals funded by the SAF were not
religious but cultural in their presentations.' 52 Had the plurality identified
other journals within the forum with competing religious viewpoints to
Wide Awake, the University action of plucking out Wide Awake because of
its Christian view would be viewpoint discrimination per se. Because of
its past practices of allowing SAF funding to reach journals that were
arguably religious, the University could not selectively apply its Guidelines
to Wide Awake.'53
The dissent seeks to shock the reader with the obvious proselytization
in Wide Awake by quoting passage after passage of Christian dogma from
the journal.'54 Justice Souter concludes that any discussion of University
issues is tainted by the Christian spin placed on each subject by Wide
Awake.'55 An important question left unanswered by Justice Souter is
how Wide Awake's apparent bias is different from the bias of any other
student journal. Common sense dictates that every student journal
proselytizes, to some extent, its particular viewpoint. Any distinction
between bias within Wide Awake and that of other subject oriented student
journals is not readily apparent.
2. The SAF Funding of the Third Party Printer
a. Neutrality-The Third EC Test
"[W]e must in each case inquire first into the purpose and object of
the government action in question and then into the practical details of the
program's operation."'' 5 6 This new test combines prongs one and two of
the Lemon test 57 and examines the action in question to ensure that the
action, as practiced, does not violate the test. Any examination of
150. Id. at 2517.
151. Id.
152. Although the plurality did not address this issue, Justice O'Connor, in concurrence,
recognized that the University forum encompassed "competing religious viewpoints." Id. at 2527.
153. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981).
154. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533-35 (Souter, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 2535.
156. Id. at 2521.
157. See supra part II.B.
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"excessive entanglement" or endorsement of religion is eliminated from this
reformulation if the first two prongs of the Lemon test are satisfied.158
The principal inquiry of this new "Modified Endorsement" test is
whether the challenged program is neutral to private religious expressions.
"More than once have we rejected the position that the Establishment
Clause even justifies, much less requires, a refusal to extend free speech
rights to religious speakers who participate in broad-reaching government
programs neutral in design."' 59  The plurality held that the University
forum was not created to advance religion or to adopt some device with the
purpose of aiding a religious cause."6 The support offered by the SAF
is for "student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic
communications media groups" of which Wide Awake was one of
fifteen.' 6 ' WAP did not actively seek a subsidy to preach religion, but
turned to the SAF for funding solely as a student journal.'62
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor identified neutrality as
"one hallmark" of the Establishment Clause.163 Justice O'Connor also
identified another settled "hallmark:" "[p]ublic funds may not be used to
endorse the religious message."' 64  Although the Court has permitted
some government funding of "secular functions performed by sectarian or-
ganizations," the Court must look at the funding component as well as the
neutrality of the program to determine if an EC violation has occurred.1
65
Similarly, the dissent argued that neutrality should be considered when
determining if an EC violation has occurred, but it is not dispositive.166
Evenhandedness is a "prerequisite to further inquiry" but the Court has
never held that "evenhandedness might be sufficient to render direct aid to
religion constitutional."'' 67 Indirect aid may be allowed if it reaches the
158. Although the plurality examines whether the SAF funding could be perceived as an
endorsement or coercion of religion by the State, the discussion may be aimed more directly at
securing the vote of Justice O'Connor than in requiring any consideration of these facts once
neutrality is determined.
159. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2525 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525 (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 642 (1988)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2540 (Souter, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2541.
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religious institutions "only as a result of the genuinely independent and
private choices of the aid recipients."'
168
b. Funding by the SAF
Once the forum was determined to be neutral, the plurality determined
that this neutrality distinguished the student fees from a tax levied for the
direct support of a church. 69  "The exaction here, by contrast, is a
student activity fee designed to reflect the reality that student life in its
many dimensions includes the necessity of wide-ranging speech and inquiry
and that student expression is an integral part of the University's
educational mission."
70
The plurality completely dismisses the point raised by the dissent that
the fee is mandatory and that students may not opt out of the SAF. A tax
is "[a] charge by the government on the income of an individual .... The
object of assessing the tax is to generate revenue to be used for the needs
of the public."' 17' The plurality directly states that the SAF is not
designed to raise revenue for the University.77 However, the mandatory
collection of a fourteen dollar fee from each individual student to help
defray the costs of student activities to the University is, arguably, a tax
imposed by the University.
The significance of whether the SAF is a tax can be seen in the long
line of precedence in which it has been held that tax revenues cannot be
used to support religion directly.73 Even though the plurality argued that
a tax, in the EC sense, must be a direct tax to support religion, the dissent
defines tax as any government outlay of funds to support religion regardless
of their origin. 17  The dissent's view distinguishes cases in which
168. Id.; see Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
(holding that the state may, through a generally applicable financial aid program, pay a visually
challenged student's tuition at a sectarian theological institution so long as the aid is paid directly
to the student, who would transmit the monies to the institution).
169. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522.
170. Id.
171. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1457 (6th ed. 1990).
172. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (1981).
The Court in Widmar recognizes that a student activity fee defrays costs to the University,
whereas the Rosenberger Court denies that the SAF is imposed to raise revenues for the
University. It is unclear whether the University would have sponsored such fora without the SAF.
173. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 614-15 (1988); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works
of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976).
174. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2546.
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government forgiveness of tax to religious organizations, as opposed to an
outlay of tax, is not considered an EC violation.'
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor echoed the dissent in
stating that the EC forbids direct government outlay of funds to support
religion. 76 Justice O'Connor also expressed concern about the inability
of students to opt out of the SAF, making the SAF appear more like a
tax. 177
A second component of the funding issue is whether the University
is directly funding a religious activity. The plurality determined that the
University, through the SAF, spent funds to encourage a diversity of views
from private speakers, including Wide Awake.1 78  In a religion-neutral
forum, a critical difference exists between government speech endorsing
religion and private religious speech endorsing religion. As evidence of its
neutrality, the University took great pains to disassociate itself from the
private speech with various disclaimers in the CIO charters and in each
journal publication. 79  Because of these disclaimers, Justice O'Connor
found that "there is no real likelihood that the speech in question is being
either endorsed or coerced by the State."'80
The plurality states that no public money flows directly to WAP'
The plurality believes that the third party funding is an incidental benefit
of forum participation and is analogous to WAP's utilizing University
facilities to develop Wide Awake. 2 "There is no difference . . . between
a school using its funds to operate a facility to which students have access,
and a school paying a third party contractor to operate the facility on its
behalf."' 3  The plurality did not consider WAP to be a religious
institution "in the usual sense of that term."'" Therefore, the SAF would
175. Id; see Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285
(1969).
176. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525.
177. Id. at 2527-28. In her conclusion, however, Justice O'Connor curiously finds a
student's ability to opt out of the find to be a critical component of her concurrence, when in
fact, students could not opt out of the SAF. Id. at 2528.
178. Id. at 2522.
179. Id. at 2523.
180. Id.
181. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523.
182. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (use of school facilities for meeting of
religious student groups is only an incidental benefit to religion).
183. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2524.
184. Id.
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not be making monetary contributions to a religious institution.'85 The
concurrence agrees with the plurality regarding the use of facilities analysis.
Although the majority views reimbursement for printing expenses paid
to a third party contractor as a sufficiently indirect payment to WAP, akin
to the use of university facilities in Widmar or the after hours use of school
facilities in Lamb 's Chapel, there is a distinction to be drawn. Both
Widmar and Lamb ' Chapel consider the use of facilities by religious
groups that are already available on campus.'86 Under this distinction,
WAP would be able to develop and print Wide Awake using University
facilities that were generally available to all groups. Here, however, the
SAF directly pays a third party vendor for printing Wide Awake. 87 The
Fourth Circuit identified this distinction, focusing on the money spent by
the government and the nature of the benefit received by WA' 88 The
court asserted that direct monetary subsidization of religious organizations
and projects is "a beast of an entirely different color,"'89 and that the EC
would not permit the use of public funds to support "a specifically religious
activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting."' 9° This is consist-
ent with Supreme Court cases that have allowed indirect aid to flow
through the recipient to ultimately benefit a religious organization.'" The
aid in these cases was akin to a grant to the individual who chooses to use
the funds in a particular secular fashion. Here, the printer who received the
payment could make no individual choice regarding disbursement of the
SAF funds. The printer could not print another journal with the money
paid by the SAF; it could only print Wide Awake.
The plurality's reliance on the payment to third party contractors as
analogous to the use of University facilities is misplaced. To illustrate, if
the availability of school facilities in Widmar were limited to physical on-
campus sites, under the plurality view, the University could use its funds
to lease space from a third party for the religious groups to meet off-
185. Id.
186. See supra parts III.A-B.
187. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2524.
188. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 285 (4th Cir. 1994),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
189. Rosenberger, 18 F. 3d at 286.
190. Id. at 285.
191. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Washington
Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). Each
case involved a program where benefits given to individuals on a religion-neutral basis were used
by the individuals to support religious institutions. Critical to the Court's holding was the fact
that the aid given to the religious institutions was indirect, only reaching the institutions through
the private choices of the individuals receiving the aid. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2541.
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campus. The direct payment to the third party vendor may be perceived
by other students as a direct payment by the University to support the
religious groups. Theoretically, the University could pay a neighboring
sectarian institution to print Wide Awake when that institution uses the
profits from printing to support its religious message.
c. Endorsement and Coercion
Although the Modified Endorsement test is relatively easy to follow,
the plurality primarily refers to the neutrality of the program when
discussing the endorsement of religion."' Using the Modified En-
dorsement test, the only instance when a religion-neutral policy would
violate the EC in a limited public forum would be when the government
paid money directly for the purpose of benefiting religion, even if that
policy could be perceived to endorse religion.193 This reasoning used by
the plurality is circular: if there is the appearance of endorsement, then the
policy must not be religion-neutral; if there is a religion-neutral policy, then
there will be no reasonable appearance of endorsement. Although the
neutrality of the forum should be an important factor in determining
whether an EC violation has occurred, it should not be the only filter
through which all other factors are strained.'94
If government is to be neutral in matters of religion, rather than
showing either favoritism or disapproval towards citizens based
on their personal religious choices, government cannot endorse
the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens without
sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders
or less than full members of the political community.'95
In Capitol Square, Justice Scalia squarely dismissed the Endorsement
test as applying to private religious expressions in traditional public
fora. "' The Modified Endorsement test seeks to extend the Capitol
Square decision to indirect funding of private religious expressions in
192. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2521-24.
193. See supra part IV.C.2.a. The premise of the Modified Endorsement test is that the
granting of indirect aid to religion within the context of the religion-neutral forum could not
violate the EC.
194. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525, 2540 (both O'Connor, J., concurring, and Souter, J.
dissenting, recognize neutrality as just one factor in considering whether an EC violation has
occurred).
195. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2450 (1995).
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limited public fora. However, to achieve a majority, the plurality may have
considered the Endorsement test to ensure Justice O'Connor's swing vote.
Since Justice O'Connor's Endorsement test relies heavily on the
circumstances and conditions of the individual case, the plurality had to
consider individual case elements that the Modified Endorsement test alone
probably would not have considered. Justice O'Connor is not satisfied that
neutrality is the end of the discussion; she looks to how the funding
appears to the "reasonable person."'97 The discussion of endorsement by
the plurality is limited to the factors considered important by Justice
O'Connor: "the explicit disclaimer, the disbursement of funds directly to
third party vendors, the vigorous nature of the forum at issue, and the
possibility for objecting students to opt out" of the SAF."'9
Central to the issue of endorsement are the disclaimers signed by each
CIO and those included in the published material.'" As discussed above,
these disclaimers seek to signify that the University is not endorsing any
CIO or any CIO publication. Although it may be clear that the reasonable
CIO would not consider the printing of Wide Awake as a University
endorsement of Christianity, it is not so clear that the reasonable student
would have the same perception when 5000 copies of Wide Awake are
allowed to be distributed on campus free of charge. There is no indication
that the general student at the University: (1) is aware of the separation
between the University and WAP as illustrated by the disclaimers; or
(2) notices or reads the disclaimer on each edition of Wide Awake.
Justice O'Connor's strongest argument against a claim of endorsement
is the vigorous nature of the forum. This reasoning resembles the neutrality
argument. Since the University promotes several differing opinions,
including Muslim and Jewish publications, there could be no appearance
of endorsement of one particular opinion. In fact, should the University not
allow Wide Awake to be distributed, this may indicate an unconstitutional
hostility toward religion. As discussed above, the neutrality of the forum
197. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 2528.
199. The University agreement with the CIO states:
The University is a Virginia public corporation and the CIO is not part of that cor-
poration, but rather exists and operates independently of the University.... The
parties understand and agree that this Agreement is the only source of any control
the University may have over the CIO or its activities.
Id. at 2526. The agreement requires that CIO's include in every letter, contract, publication, or
other written materials the following: "Although this organization has members who are
University of Virginia students (faculty) (employees), the organization is independent of the
corporation which is the University and which is not responsible for the organization's contracts,
acts or omissions." Id. at 2527.
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is only a consideration and is not dispositive of full compliance with the
EC.
Considering the nature of the disclaimers, the discussion of third party
vendors above, and the lack of an "opt-out" clause in the SAF, O'Connor's
finding of no endorsement would seem not to apply to the "reasonable"
University student. To find the plurality and Justice O'Connor's factors
dispositive, one would have to assume that the reasonable University
student is one who is fully aware of the history, requirements, and
peculiarities of the forum, as the test requires. As there are only fifteen
publications distributed by the University among more than 17,000
students, to expect a reasonable student to be aware of the disclaimers, the
presence of a third party vendor, and the opportunity to opt out of the SAF
is ambitious at best.
V. CONCLUSION
By extending protection of private religious expression to the quasi-
funding of that expression when it takes place in a religion-neutral, limited
public forum, the Court severely limits the application of the EC to
government-funded private religious expression. The plurality would
regard the neutrality of the forum as the determining factor. As long as the
forum is truly neutral, government cannot be perceived as endorsing a
religious message by indirect funding of private religious expression. This
should not be, however, the only consideration. The Supreme Court is one
vote away from eliminating the consideration of any appearance of
government endorsement in cases where the government action takes the
form of an indirect payment supporting some private religious expression
in a religion-neutral forum. Unlike the decisions in Widmar and Lamb's
Chapel, the Rosenberger plurality does not consider the danger of religious
domination of an otherwise neutral public forum to be a danger against
which the EC should protect.
The plurality recognized that a chilling effect may occur when state
officials and courts are allowed to review publications to ferret out views
that principally manifest a belief in a divine being. The plurality, however,
does not recognize the possible chilling effect of its holding. Considering
the line that the plurality has drawn between neutrality and a violation of
the EC, the government may choose to eliminate any questionable forum
altogether--the ultimate chilling of private speech. The holding does not
require government to continue funding all public fora, only not to deny
funding for private religious expression once the forum exists.
19961
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After Rosenberger, the application of the EC in a neutral, limited
public forum is restricted to direct payment by the government in support
of religion. Indirect payments within a religion-neutral forum that may
send a strong message of endorsement are permitted, as neutrality is the
presumptive guarantee that no endorsement can take place.
The plurality decision does nothing to clarify the already garbled EC
jurisprudence. When is indirect aid too direct? Does the Court abandon
any demarcation between a designated and limited public forum? Since the
Court did not overrule the Lemon or Endorsement tests, must the lower
court use the Modified Endorsement test in only public university forum
situations? The Court has supplied us with many more questions than
answers.
Religious views have continued to flourish. Some become favored
not because of government support but because they survive criticism and
discussion at church, in the home, or in public discourse. After Rosen-
berger, private religious speech is not left to the church, synagogue, or
other religious bodies, but is able to gain credibility and support from the
state. State funding, albeit indirect, of private religious expressions
condoning hate, bigotry and violence could be protected by the Constitution
if the forum where the expression occurs is religion-neutral.
The primary issue is where to draw the line. The Rosenberger Court
draws a line that can be easily redrawn to expand government support or
involvement in the expression of religious viewpoints, effectively erasing
the Endorsement and the Lemon tests. The decision may suggest an
opportunity for religious groups to gain a greater voice in government-
promoted fora or to dominate these fora altogether. Under Rosenberger,
complete government neutrality would limit the EC to forbid government
from expressing a preference for a particular religion or from paying the
church bills directly.
The EC provides that the government "shall make no law respecting
the establishment of religion."2" This language was originally intended
to stop the government from forcing a specific religious view on the people
and from disenfranchising those who are not members of the endorsed
religious belief. The use of government-sponsored fora as conduits to
communicate private religious views is protected by the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment. The government, however, should not be required
to subsidize private religious expression where there is even a reasonable
hint of government endorsement. Religious diversity and expression have
200. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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survived and flourished in the United States without such direct government
intervention. There is no need to further expand protection for private
religious expression.
Keith A. Wilson*
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